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APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS ON MOTIONS TO INTERVENE
Intervention is a device whereby a person who is not an original litigant but
has interests to protect in a proceeding may intervene therein against the plaintiff,
defendant or both.1 Intervention is sought by motion for leave to file a complaint2
and is granted or denied by order of the court. It is the purpose of this note to
examine the appealability of these orders.
It is well settled in all jurisdictions that an order granting intervention is not
directly appealable. 3 The courts are agreed that an order granting intervention is
an intermediary order, not determining the rights of any party with finality.4 It
is apparent that the courts recognize that the original litigants' rights are ade-
quately protected by granting a review of the order upon an appeal from the final
judgment in the cause,5 though this is rarely brought out in the cases.
Notwithstanding that the California Code of Civil Procedure makes no express
provision for the appeal of an order denying a motion to intervene, such an order
is appealable.6 The reason most frequently offered is that an order denying inter-
vention amounts in effect to a final judgment as to the party seeking interven-
tion.7 If a party is denied intervention he is removed entirely from the litigation
and his rights are determined completely and finally. There is nothing left for
such party to do but to comply or not comply with the decree, which satisfies the
"test" of finality as posited by some courts.8
I BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY 956 (4th ed. 1951).
'See CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 387.
' Otten v. Baltimore & 0. R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d
377 (1951).
"An order directing appellee to intervene as a defendant was deemed interlocutory, not
final in nature, and unappealable in H. M. Rowe Co. v. Rowe, 154 Md. 599, 141 At. 334
(1928). To the same effect is Taylor v. Western States Land & Mortgage Co., 63 Cal. App.
2d 401, 147 P.2d 36 (1944) ; Ray v. Anderson, 117 Ga. 136, 43 S.E. 408 (1903) ; Ray v.
Moore, 19 Ind. App. 690, 49 N.E. 1083 (1898).
5Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 379 (1951). But see London P. & A. Bank v. Abrams, 6 Ariz. 87, 53
Pac. 588 (1898), the Arizona Supreme Court holding that intervention is completely within
the discretion of the court and the exercise of that discretion cannot be reviewed on appeal
from a final judgment in the cause.
'Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 574, 283 P.2d 704 (1955) ; Dollenmayer v. Pryor,
150 Cal. 1, 87 Pac. 616 (1906) ; Lopez v. Bell, 207 Cal. App. 2d 394, 24 Cal. Rptr. 626
(1962) ; People v. City of Long Beach, 183 Cal. App. 2d 271, 6 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1960). The
person whose motion to intervene has been denied is not afforded the privilege of appealing
the final judgment in the original action inasmuch as he is not "aggrieved" by the judgment.
See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 938. Nor is he a party to the record. Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S.
14 (1877) ; Braun v. Brown, 13 Cal. 2d 130, 87 P.2d 1009 (1939) ; Lopez v. Bell, 207 Cal.
App. 2d 394, 24 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1962). If a party elects to forego the direct appeal provided
him in California, he loses his right to appeal, as he cannot appeal the final judgment in the
cause. In the federal courts the person whose motion to intervene has been denied has no
right to appeal at any stage of the proceeding when the motion was made under the provi-
sions for permissive intervention. Thompson v. Broadfoot, 165 F.2d 744 (2nd Cir. 1948). A
person in this situation apparently has no alternative but to bring his own action, as he has
no appeal or mode of review from the order keeping him out of the existing action.
' Britt v. East Side Hardware Co., 25 Cal. App. 231, 143 Pac. 244 (1914).
' "[W]here no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or non-
compliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final. . . ." Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal.
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The federal courts, on the other hand, draw a distinction between intervention
as a matter of right (Federal Rule 24(a) 9), and "permissive" intervention (Fed-
eral Rule 24(b) 10). The interests in the litigation of the party seeking interven-
tion bring him within the purview of one or the other of these categories. An
appeal is allowed from an order denying intervention when the motion is made as
a matter of right."1 Conversely, an order denying intervention when the motion
is made under the provisions for permissive intervention is unappealable. 1 2
The United States Supreme Court in Allen Calculators, Inc. v. National Cash
Register Co. 13 stated, however, that a denial of a motion to intervene (when made
under Federal Rule 24(b)) is appealable if the party seeking intervention can
show a clear abuse of discretion. But the Court emphasized that the exercise of
discretion in a matter of this sort is not reviewable by an appellate court unless
clear abuse is shown, and that it is not ordinarily possible to determine that ques-
tion except in the light of the whole record.1 4 This latter statement would seem
to imply that even were there an abuse of discretion it is doubtful the court would
entertain an appeal because of the difficulty in ascertaining such an abuse. This
view, that an abuse of discretion may provide sufficient grounds for appeal, has
been announced by the federal courts generally,15 but no case exists where a
"clear abuse of discretion" formed the basis of an appeal.
The California courts recognize intervention not as a matter of right,' 6 but
2d 659, 670, 123 P.2d 11, 17 (1942) ; Kneeland v. Ethicon Suture Laboratories, 113 Cal. App.
2d 335, 248 P.2d 447 (1952).
'F FD. R. Crv. P. 24(a): "Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall
be permitted to intervene in an action (1) When a statute of the United States confers an un-
conditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judg-
ment in the action; or (3) When the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution of property which is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition
of the court or an officer thereof."
"'Id. 24(b): "Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be per-
mitted to intervene in an action (1) When a statute of the United States confers a condi-
tional right to intervene; or (2) When an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of
claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state gov-
ernmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued
or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely appli-
cation may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties." (Emphasis added.)
" Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1960) ; Farmland Irr. Co. v.
Dopplmaier, 220 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1955) ; Cuthil v. Ortman-Miller Mach. Co., 216 F.2d 336
(2d Cir. 1954).
" United States v. California Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1928) ; Thompson v. Broadfoot,
165 F.2d 744 (2d Cir. 1948); Palmer v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 111 F.2d 115
(2d Cir. 1940).
'a 322 U.S. 137 (1943).
,Id. at 142.
"New York City v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U.S. 312 (1922) ; Textile Workers Union of
America, CIO v. Allendale Co., 226 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
' "In re Yokohama Specie Bank, 86 Cal. App. 2d 545, 195 P.2d 555 (1948).
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as a matter of discretion. 17 Intervention is governed by statute', and is permis-
sive, application being made by leave of court.19 Notwithstanding these frequent
references to intervention as a discretionary matter, the California courts allow
an appeal from a denial of such motion in all instances. In fact, the well estab-
lished rule that an appellate court will not disturb the action of a trial court in
the exercise of its discretionary power has been declared to be inapplicable when
determining appealability.20 Thus, the rule applied in California differs in part
from that applied in the federal courts. Both jurisdictions reach the same result
where a party has interests sufficient to qualify him for intervention in the
federal courts under Federal Rule 24(a) and he will be granted an appeal in
either jurisdiction. The result is different, however, when the party has interests
qualifying him for intervention under Federal Rule 24(b). A party in the latter
circumstance will be denied an appeal in the federal courts but granted the appeal
in California, since the California courts allow an appeal from any order deny-
ing intervention.
The rule applied by the federal courts appears to be more practical than the
California rule, but only because the code provision governing intervention in
the federal courts21 is more restrictive than the provision in California.2 2 Due
to the loosely written statutory provision for intervention in California2" appeal
as a matter of right is compelled. To deny an appeal in all cases would prejudice
those having substantial interests, and to impose on the courts the task of
categorizing interests and formulating a rule of appeal applicable thereto would
be highly impractical. Thus the present rule in California is the only just one un-
der the existing statute. However, a more restrictive provision for intervention in
California would allow the application of a rule similar to that applied in the fed-
eral courts, and this would appear to be a more adequate and practical solution.
There is, of course, the historic idea based on some concept of "fairness" or
"justice" that every party should have the benefit of an appeal. There are definite-
ly many situations where the right to appeal is desirable, but by the same token
there are those situations where it is not. It appears that an order denying inter-
vention may under certain circumstances be one such situation.
There are three factors weighing heavily against allowing an appeal under
these circumstances. First, an appeal is time consuming (currently taking ap-
proximately eighteen months24 )-perhaps the strongest argument against it.
Secondly, by granting all appeals from orders denying intervention, the courts
facilitate the unscrupulous use of this device to effect a desired delay. This evil
inheres because in the case of intervention the original action must be stayed
"'People v. City of Long Beach, 183 Cal. App. 2d 271, 6 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1960) ; In re
Yokohama Specie Bank, 86 Cal. App. 2d 545, 195 P.2d 555 (1948).
"S CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 387.
"
9In re Yokohama Specie Bank, 86 Cal. App. 2d 545, 195 P.2d 555 (1948).
'o Luck v. Luck, 83 Cal. 574, 23 Pac. 1035 (1890).1FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
.2 CAL. CODE CMv. PRoc. § 387: "At any time before trial, any person, who has an interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, may intervene in the action or proceeding .. 
23 Ibid.
" Halpin, Delay on Appeal, 38 CAL. S. BAR J. 279, 283 (1963).
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until final determination of the appeal; 25 and it is no difficult task for a party to
procure another to intervene and then appeal a subsequent denial. A third un-
desirable incident is apparent even when the motion is made in good faith: the
resultant excessive delay in most cases would be harmful to the original litigants.
The federal courts with the aid of Federal Rule 2 4 (a) allow an appeal when
the moving party's interests are substantial, and the adoption of a similar scheme
in California would provide for the same protection. The legislators could de-
termine what interests should be deemed substantial and the scope of the pro-
tection of such interests would be broad or narrow depending on the desired ends.
The adoption of a scheme similar to that applied in the federal courts would
not do away with the appeal from an order denying intervention altogether, but
only where the moving party's interests are slight. It is urged that such a result
would be beneficial. Though appeals from orders denying intervention in the
aggregate take up little appellate court time, they take up some, and the savings
made here coupled with the even more significant elimination of harmful delay
and the possibility of abuse, strongly endorse the desirability of abrogating the
appeal under the aforementioned circumstances.
As an alternative to the appeal the legislature could provide for review by
writ of mandamus. Such procedure has been increasingly utilized to provide for
unappealable orders and has generally enjoyed a more expanded scope in recent
times. 26
The writ is not a matter of right but is discretionary, and may be denied with-
out opinion.27 For this reason, any intentional abuse of the intervention proce-
dure will have no chance of success, and in legitimate instances an abuse of
discretion by the trial court would be substantially precluded. Furthermore, any
delay will be minimized.
Donald L. Humphreys*
= CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 946.
-132 CAL. JuR. 2d Mandamus § 4 (1956); Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review
State-Wide Administrative Bodies in California, 29 CALIF. L. REv. 276 (1941).
2732 CAL. Jut. 2d Mandamus § 4 (1956).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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